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Abstract
Objective: We test the proposition that both social orientation and cognitive style are constructs 
consisting of loosely related attributes. Thus, measures of each construct should weakly correlate 
among themselves, forming intra-individually stable profiles across measures over time. 
Method:  Study 1 tested diverse samples of Americans (N = 233) and Japanese (N = 433) with a 
wide range of measures of social orientation and cognitive style to explore correlations among 
these measures in a cross-cultural context, using demographically heterogeneous samples. Study 
2 recruited a new sample of 485 Americans and Canadians and examined their profiles on 
measures of social orientation and cognitive style twice, one month apart, to assess the stability 
of individual profiles using these variables. 
Results: Despite finding typical cross-cultural differences, Study 1 demonstrated negligible 
correlations both among measures of social orientation and among measures of cognitive style. 
Study 2 demonstrated stable intra-individual behavioral profiles across measures capturing 
idiosyncratic patters of social orientation and cognitive style, despite negligible correlations 
among the same measures. 
Conclusion: The results provide support for the behavioral profile approach to conceptualizing 
social orientation and cognitive style, highlighting the need to assess intra-individual stability of 
psychological constructs in cross-cultural research.
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Psychological scientists tend to conceptualize culture from two distinct perspectives. On 
the one hand, cross-cultural researchers have assumed that culture is personality writ large, and 
have aimed to identify unitary constructs to assess individual differences across different 
cultures (Harris, 1979; Skinner, 1938; Smith & Bond, 1998). On the other hand, cultural 
psychologists have focused on specifics of psychological processes within a given culture, 
opposing the idea that cultural differences are reducible to a handful of individual differences 
(Malinowski, 1992; Shweder, 1991; Wundt, 1888). Despite fundamental differences between 
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increasing interest in the same two cultural constructs: social orientation, namely independence 
vs. interdependence1 (ie.g.  the relative importance of self in relation to others; Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989) and cognitive style (e.g, the degree to which contexts are 
considered in reasoning; Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001; Witkin & Goodenough, 
1981). 
Recently, the validity of these constructs was called into a question, with a handful of 
studies demonstrating that measures of social orientation do not correlate among themselves nor 
do measures of cognitive style correlate among themselves (Dong, Talhelm, & Ren, 2018; 
Kitayama, Park, Servincer, Karasawa, & Uskul, 2009; Na et al., 2010; San Martin, Schug, & 
Maddux, 2019). Following on this initial work, we attempted to systematically evaluate the 
correlations among measures of social orientation and among measures of cognitive style. We 
also aimed to explore new ways to conceptualize social orientation and cognitive style through 
the lens of behavioral profiles.  
Social orientation and cognitive style
Ideas concerning social orientation and cognitive style can be traced to the late 19th 
century. For instance, Tӧnnies (1887/1988) described human relationship patterns in terms of 
one’s social orientation toward a community vs. one's self-interest. Contemporary definitions of 
social orientation similarly focus on the relative importance of one’s group vs. the self (Markus 
& Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989; Varnum, Grossmann, Kitayama, & Nisbett, 2010). This 
definition has been applied to characterize cultural differences in emotion, motivation and the 
self, with some cultures favoring interdependence –viewing the self as connected to others and 
emphasizing harmonious relations with others – and other cultures favoring independence – 
viewing the self as separate from others and emphasizing uniqueness (Markus & Kitayama, 
1991). 
Another major difference between cultures is holistic vs. analytic cognitive style 
characterized as preference for contextualized vs. decontextualized cognition (Nisbett et al., 2001; 
Varnum et al., 2010; Witkin & Goodenough, 1981). This distinction can be traced back to 
William James, who distinguished between associative and rule-governed reasoning (1890/1950). 
1 Also referred to as individualism-collectivism (Hofstede, 1980; Triandis, 1989) or Gesellschaft vs. Gemeinschaft 
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The notion of cognitive style has been applied to characterize cultural differences in social 
cognition, with some cultures preferring a holistic cognitive style – focusing on the larger 
context and attending to similarities and relationships – and other cultures preferring an analytic 
cognitive style – separating a focal object from its context and reasoning about it using 
categories and rules (Nisbett et al., 2001).
Using these characterizations of social orientation and cognitive style, researchers have 
documented a wide range of group-level differences. East Asians are relatively interdependent 
and holistic as compared to Americans (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Nisbett et al., 2001). Eastern 
Europeans are relatively interdependent and holistic as compared to Western Europeans (Kühnen 
et al., 2001; Varnum, Grossmann, Katunar, Kitayama, & Nisbett, 2008), who are in turn more 
interdependent and holistic than North Americans (Kitayama et al., 2009). Similar variations 
occur within countries. Southern Italians are relatively more interdependent and holistic than 
Northern Italians (2007) and Japanese from Hokkaido (a northern island) are relatively more 
independent and analytic than mainland Japanese (Kitayama et al., 2006). Likewise, people from 
middle-class backgrounds are more independent and analytic than people from working-class 
backgrounds (Grossmann & Varnum, 2011; Kraus, Piff, Mendoza-Denton, Rheinschmidt, & 
Keltner, 2012; Stephens, Fryberg, & Markus, 2011; Varnum, Na, Murata, & Kitayama, 2012). 
Social orientation and cognitive style: Unitary construct vs. behavioral profile perspectives
A noteworthy development in cross-cultural research concerns treating both social 
orientation and cognitive style as unitary constructs that are defined by a mutually correlated 
network of features (Choi, Koo, & Choi, 2007; Singelis, 1994; Triandis, 1996). That is, some 
scholars assume that a single task with decent reliability would be sufficient for assessing 
individual differences in these constructs. For example, an individual whose score was higher on 
one type of task measuring interdependence would be expected to have a higher score on every 
other task measuring interdependence. This view is rooted in differential psychology (e.g., 
theorizing about the g-factor in research on cognitive abilities; Allport & Odbert, 1936; Eysenck, 
1990; McCrae & Costa, 1999). From this perspective, one’s scores on a single task of a construct 
would predict one’s scores in other measures of the same construct.
Unitary construct perspective is not the only way to conceptualize individual differences.  
An alternative, behavioral profile perspective suggests that individual differences in either social 
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domains of broader constructs that successfully differentiate cultures. We elaborate on this 
perspective below. 
Several contemporary models of individual differences suggest that personality is best 
viewed through the lens of situationally-contingent profiles (Fleeson, 2007; Furr & Funder, 2004; 
Mischel & Shoda, 1995). In this view, personality characteristics may be expressed differently 
from one situation to the next, resulting in low consistency across situations but high consistency 
within the same situation across time. Thus, reliable cross-situational profiles can emerge. In 
these theoretical models, variability is not regarded as a random error. Instead, these models 
suggest that the variability can be systematic, reflecting stable profiles of one’s behaviors across 
various situations (Furr, 2009; Shoda, Mischel, & Wright, 1994). For example, Person A may be 
aggressive at a party and would also be aggressive at another similar party (measured with a 
“party aggression” instrument) although the person may not be aggressive in a different situation, 
such as at work (a tendency which might be measured with a “work aggression” instrument). In 
contrast, Person B may be consistently aggressive at work, but not at all aggressive during social 
gatherings. As a consequence, distinct and stable behavioral profiles of Person A and Person B 
would yield negligible correlations between these “aggression” measures when aggregating 
responses across multiple individuals. 
Just as within-person variability across different situations is an integral aspect of one’s 
personality system, so too could within-person variability across measures be an important 
aspect of one’s cultural orientation. Specifically, different situations require different 
psychological skills or propensities, which allows for within-person variability in the personality 
system. Likewise, different measures of social orientation or cognitive style recruit different 
types of psychological skills or propensities, which leads to within-person variability across 
measures. Notably, measures of social orientation/cognitive style capture a wide range of ways 
people use to navigate their culture. For social orientation, measures include the representation of 
emotions, self-views, emotional reactivity, or adherence to social norms. For cognitive style, 
measures include attention, memory, and higher-order reasoning. Therefore, unique profiles of 
satisfying the culture-specific ways of being can exist depending on personality traits, different 
types of skills, exposure to idiosyncratic cultural niches, and preferences for some aspects of a 
culture rather than others. For one person, this may include emphasizing the self, but ignoring 
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a weaker focus on one's self. Importantly, such profiles may remain stable over time. As a 
consequence, performance on measures of social orientation (or cognitive style) may show weak 
consistency across tasks at a given time point, while simultaneously forming cross-temporally 
stable behavioral profiles. An empirical test of this proposition requires examining whether one’s 
profiles of responses to various measures of social orientation / cognitive style would be stable 
across time points.
Past research reveals an isomorphic puzzle of social orientation and cognitive style
A handful of studies have begun to explore the construct-related nature of social 
orientation and cognitive style. Results from these studies reveal that measures within each 
ostensible construct of social orientation or cognitive style are negligibly correlated. Kitayama 
and colleagues (2009) administered four social-orientation and two cognitive-style measures in 
four different cultures (the US, UK, Germany, & Japan) and found that measures did not 
correlate among themselves within each culture. Building on this initial demonstration, Na and 
colleagues (2010) used a wide range of measures of social orientation and cognitive style in the 
US and found that correlations among measures of each construct were negligible, even though 
these measures systematically differentiated working class participants from middle-class 
participants. The negligible cross-measures correlations suggested that individual differences in 
social orientation and cognitive style do not represent distinct unitary constructs. 
Na et al. (2010) also demonstrated the lack of isomorphism (i.e., the differences between 
individual level and cultural level): Examination of cognitive style scores on two tasks collected 
in five countries (Croatia, Germany, Japan, UK, and the US) revealed substantial correlations on 
the group level (r = .82), despite negligible individual-level correlations within each country. 
This lack of isomorphism across individual and cultural levels is consistent with earlier theories 
in cross-cultural research (Hofstede, 1980; Schwartz, 1994). Moreover, it suggests that social 
orientation and cognitive style do not follow the same pattern as cultural values (Fischer & 
Poortinga, 2012) or Big Five personality (McCrae, Terracciano, & Personality Profiles of 
Cultures Project, 2005), in that both of them show a convergence between individual and group 
levels.
Limitations of prior research
Though the initial evidence appears to suggest that neither social orientation nor 
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the tasks used (Kitayama et al., 2009) or diversity of samples (Na et al., 2010). Kitayama and 
colleagues employed only a small number of social cognitive tasks, whereas Na and colleagues 
have only tested sub-groups within the US and looked at correlations between only two measures 
in a handful of countries. Moreover, little is known about the cross-temporal stability of tasks 
themselves. It is possible that the measures do not even show intra-individual stability and 
therefore violate the ergodicity principle (Molenaar & Campbell, 2009), which states that intra-
individual consistency is a necessary condition for making inter-individual inferences, including 
examination of relationships between measures.
Present research
We address prior limitations by systematically replicating previous observations of 
negligible correlations among a broad range of tasks assessing social orientation and cognitive 
style, respectively, on random-stratified samples of Japanese and Americans (Study 1). We 
selected these target cultures because of the frequency with which these groups have been used 
in prior research on social orientation as well as cognitive style (e.g., Markus and Kitayama, 
1991; Nisbett et al., 2001). Second, we examined whether within-person variability would be 
stable and predictable (Study 2). Toward this end, we asked a community sample of Americans 
and Canadians to complete several measures of social orientation and cognitive style at different 
time points and examined both the stability of individual tasks, as well as the cross-temporal 
stability of possible behavioral profiles assessed via latent class analyses. 
Study 1
Study 1 attempted to systematically probe the inter-individual associations of a range of 
widely-used measures of social orientation / cognitive style with diverse samples of Japanese and 
Americans. We expected that the correlations among measures of social orientation / cognitive 
style would be negligible within each culture and perhaps also when collapsing across both 
cultural groups. 
Methods
Participants. We recruited a socio-economically diverse sample of Japanese from the 
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= 233)2  with an approximately equal number of participants of both genders and of each of three 
age groups (25-40, 41-59, 60-79). Detailed demographic information is summarized in Table 1.
Procedure. Participants in the US were invited to three different sessions of a two-
hour study and paid $70 for each session. Participants in Japan first filled out a questionnaire 
packet and came in for two different laboratory sessions in return for equivalent monetary 
compensation. In these sessions, participants completed a range of social and cognitive tasks, 
selected for their success in differentiating cultural groups in prior research (see Varnum, 
Grossmann, Kitayama, & Nisbett, 2010, for review). Since the data were collected across three 
sessions and participants were allowed to skip any question they were uncomfortable with, the 
number of participants varies across tasks (See Table 2). We report results from six social and 
eleven cognitive measures previously used as markers of social orientation and cognitive style, 
respectively. For each measure of the social construct, larger values reflect more interdependent 
and less independent social orientation. For each of the cognitive construct, larger values reflect 
more holistic and less analytic cognitive style. For measures consisting of sub-scores, we 
calculated a relative score reflecting more interdependence/holistic reasoning and less 
independence/analytic reasoning based on prior theorizing and empirical findings (e.g., 
Kitayama, 2002; Na et al., 2010). Although the main analyses were based on the relative indexes, 
we performed relevant analyses on sub-scores in the supplementary materials which yield very 
similar results (See STables 1 & 2). The following section describes exactly how we calculated 
scores for each task. Table 3 summarizes the means, standard deviations, and reliabilities of the 
measures. Also, we reported reliabilities of sub-scores in the case of measures with sub-scores. 
Data repository. Supplemental analyses and data for both studies are posted online at 
https:// osf.io/hb2zg.
Measures of Independent vs. Interdependent Social Orientation
Inclusion of Other in the Self (IOS) scale. The IOS scale (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992) 
is a pictorial measure of closeness. In the IOS scale, a series of two circles is provided where the 
degree of overlap between them progresses linearly, creating a seven-point scale of relational 
2 Originally, we recruited participants over 79 years of age in the US (n = 12). For the sake of comparability with the 
Japanese sample, we excluded them from the analyses. Results remain virtually identical if including this sub-
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closeness. Participants selected one pair of circles that best represents their relationships with 
family members. 
Intensity of Engaged Emotion. This measure was computed from the Implicit Social 
Orientation Questionnaire (Kitayama, Mesquita, & Karasawa, 2006). In this questionnaire, 
participants were asked to remember 10 social episodes (e.g. “when I had a positive interaction 
with friends) and indicate the intensity of experiencing each of 12 emotions. Among those 
emotions, three different types were embedded: general positive emotions (e.g., happiness), 
socially engaged positive emotions (e.g., friendly feeling), & socially disengaged positive 
emotions (e.g., personal pride). We calculated the relative intensity of experiencing engaged vs. 
disengaged emotions as an index of the relative importance of social relations. The score was the 
average of engaged minus disengaged emotions across ten episodes.
Predictors of Happiness. This measure was also computed from the Implicit Social 
Orientation Questionnaire (Kitayama, Mesquita, & Karasawa, 2006). In this measure, we 
examined the relative effects of socially engaged emotions vs. socially disengaged emotions on 
happiness. The score was the regression coefficients predicting general positive emotions as a 
function of socially engaged vs. socially disengaged emotions. To the extent that they view 
themselves as connected to others, socially engaged emotions would be more associated with 
happiness more than socially disengaged emotions. 
Self-inflation. We calculated this measure following the guidelines of the Sociogram task 
(Duffy, Uchida, & Kitayama, 2013). In the task, participants were asked to draw their social 
network by using circles to represent the self and others. We calculated the size (i.e., diameter) of 
the self-circle relative to the other-circles as an index of self-inflation. The score was calculated 
by dividing the size of self-circle by the average size of other circles while controlling for the 
overall area of the drawing (defined by the outer horizontal and vertical margins).
Vocal Stroop task. In the Vocal Stroop task, words that are either positive (e.g., 
"wedding") or negative (e.g., "funeral") are pronounced in either an emotionally positive or 
negative tone (Kitayama & Ishii, 2002).  Participants were asked to judge whether each word is 
positive or negative and we measured the reaction time for congruent trials (positive words in 
positive tone or negative words in negative tone) and incongruent trials (positive words in 
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The score was the interference effect of vocal tone: reaction times for incongruent trials (e.g., 
"wedding" in a negative tone) minus the congruent trials (e.g., "wedding" in a positive tone).
Self-Construal scale. In the Self-Construal scale (Singelis, 1994), participants indicated 
how much they agreed with ten independent (e.g. "I always try to have my own opinions") and 
ten interdependent statements (e.g., "I am concerned about what people think of me"). The score 
was ratings of interdependent statements minus those of independent statements. 
Measures of Analytic vs. Holistic Cognitive Style
Inclusion task. The task investigated the amount of information participants considered 
before making the final attribution (Choi, Dalal, Kim-Prieto, & Park, 2003). In the task, 
participants imagined that they were a detective investigating a murder case. Participants 
received 97 clues that may or may not be relevant to the case (e.g., the number of pets the victim 
owned and the victim's history of sexual abuse by his/her parents) with a task to exclude clues 
which they thought were causally irrelevant. The score was the number of items that participant 
thought was causally relevant to the event.
Proverb task. The task measured whether people preferred dialectical (holistic) vs. linear 
(analytic) reasoning (Peng & Nisbett, 1999). Participants read eight dialectical ("Too humble is 
half proud") and eight non-dialectical ("One against all is certain to fall") proverbs, reporting 
their preferences for each proverb on a 7-point scale (1 = Not at all to 7 = Very much). The score 
was the relative preference for dialectical proverbs vs. the non-dialectical proverbs. 
Change task. This task measured how much participants thought that contradictory events 
depicted in a written scenario (e.g., people who fought as children might become lovers as adults 
or a person who grew up in a low-income family might become rich) was likely to happen in the 
future (Ji, Nisbett, & Su, 2001).  To the extent that participant based their reasoning on focal 
information (i.e., the current status), they believe that a future event that is contradictory to the 
current status would be less likely to happen. There were eight scenarios, and participants were 
asked to estimate a probability for each scenario (0-100 %).
Triad task. The task examined whether participants categorized 14 objects based on a 
thematic relation vs. focal attributes (Chiu, 1972). For each object (e.g., “a cow”), participants 
chose one of two alternatives (e.g., “chicken” vs. “grass”). One alternative was thematically 
related to the target (e.g., grass) and the other belonged to the same taxonomic category as the 
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Causal Attribution Task. The task examined the extent to which participants attributed 
the causality to an actor vs. the context (Kitayama, Ishii, Imada, Takemura, & Ramaswamy, 
2006). Specifically, participants read four vignettes describing either positive or negative 
behavior of a target (two positive vignettes and two negative vignettes). For each vignette, they 
indicated their level of agreement with two items reflecting dispositional attribution and two 
items reflecting situational attribution on a 7-point scale (1: Strongly Disagree to 7: Strongly 
Agree). Following prior research, the final score concerned participants’ ratings for situational 
attributions minus those for dispositional attributions (Kitayama et al., 2006). 
Outside-in task.  The task measured whether participants took a third person (holistic) or 
a first person (analytic) perspective when they thought about their past experience (Cohen & 
Gunz, 2002). First, participants recalled a specific instance of two social situations (when you 
had a conversation with a friend or when you were embarrassed). Next, they indicated whether 
the memory was a first-person memory or a third-person memory on an 11-point scale (1 = 
Entirely first-person memory to 11 = Entirely third-person memory).
Framed Line Test (FLT). The FLT measured how easily participants ignored vs. took into 
account contextual information (Kitayama, Duffy, Kawamura, & Larsen, 2003).  In this task, 
participants saw a square with a line drawn inside it and were asked to reproduce the line inside a 
new square of a different size either by duplicating its absolute length (ignoring the context of 
the square) or its length relative to the square (by drawing a line with the same proportion as in 
the original square). The score was the error in millimeters for the absolute judgments minus the 
error in millimeters for the relative judgments. 
Change Blindness task. The task examined how easily participants detected changes in 
focal vs. backgrounds objects in order to measure whether they paid attention to focal vs. 
background objects (Masuda & Nisbett, 2006). Specifically, participants watched four pairs of 
animated scenes, such as a construction site and an airport. Each scene pair consisted of two 
similar, but slightly different vignettes, and participants were asked to detect the difference 
between them. The number of changes noticed in focal objects and contexts was counted. 
Following prior research, the final score was the frequency of contextual changes noticed minus 
the frequency of focal object changes noticed (Masuda & Nisbett, 2006). Note that both Japanese 
and American participants detected more changes in the context than in focal objects. One may 
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objects than in the context. However, if focal objects are not salient enough, even Americans 
may not be attracted by them. In other words, one's tendency to attend to focal vs. background 
objects is reflected in the relative difference between focal and background changes. A similar 
logic applies to two other measures described below.
Underwater Animations task. Participants watched eight animated vignettes of fish and 
were asked to recall what they saw after seeing each vignette. As in the narrative task, we 
counted the number of statements about focal objects (i.e., focal fish) and background objects or 
the context. The final score concerned the frequency that participants mentioned the context 
minus the frequency they mentioned focal fish. 
Narrative task. The task examined whether participants paid attention to the main 
character vs. other supporting characters (Chua, Leu, & Nisbett, 2005). In this task, participants 
watched two video clips (events at Swimming Pool and Library) and read two one-page stories 
(about a working mother, Kathy, and a college graduate, Lea). After watching/reading each 
episode, participants were asked to recall what they saw or read and we counted the number of 
statements about focal characters and other supporting characters. The final score was the 
frequency that other characters were mentioned minus the frequency that focal characters were 
mentioned.   
Twenty Statements Task. In the TST (Kuhn & McPartland, 1954), participants were asked 
to describe themselves in twenty different ways. The statements were coded as reflecting 
abstract/dispositional representation vs. concrete/contextual representation of self, following the 
guidelines outlined by Rhee, Uleman, Lee, and Roman (1995). For instance, decontextualized 
statements like “kind,” “friendly,” as well as universal and existential statements like “human 
being,” or “myself” were quantified as abstract, whereas statements like “kind to my parents,” 
“friendly to my neighbors,” as well as statements representing social identity “salesperson,” and 
preferences “like to help people” were quantified as contextualized. The score was the proportion 
of concrete/contextual statements.
Results
We replicated previously reported cultural differences on measures of social orientation 
and cognitive style. As Table 3 indicates, Japanese showed more interdependent (vs. independent) 
social orientation on most measures, with the cultural differences being of moderate/high 
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analytic) cognitive style than Americans on most measures (except for FLT), with the cultural 
differences being of low to moderate magnitude.3 
If coherent group differences are due to different cultural distributions of unitary 
constructs of social orientation and cognitive style, respectively, correlations among measures 
should be positive and significant. However, we observed negligible correlations for social 
orientation not only in the US (mean r = .05 & median r = .02) but also in Japan (mean r = .04 & 
median r = .05, see Table 4). These correlations did not increase when collapsing across cultural 
groups, mean r = .10 & median r = .07 (STable 3). Similarly, cognitive style measures did not 
correlate among themselves either in Japan (mean r = .03 & median r = -.004) or the US (mean r 
= .02 & median r = -.01, see Table 5.) Correlations were weak even when collapsed across 
cultures, mean r = .08 & mean r = .06 (STable 4). 
Next, we conducted exploratory factor analyses (extraction: maximum likelihood) within 
each culture and when collapsed across cultures to further examine the coherence at the 
individual level. For social orientation, the first factor did not explain more variance (Japan: 
17.44%, US: 17.85%; All: 19.01%) than each measure would on its own (i.e., when assuming 
measures are orthogonal; 17%). Results were similar for cognitive style: The variance explained 
by the first factor (Japan: 14.11%, US: 12.14%, All: 11.87%) was only trivially different from 
the standard criterion of variance explained for one measure out of eleven (9%). The first factor 
was driven by a single measure for both social orientation and cognitive style (see Table 6). 
 In sum, measures of social orientation or cognitive style showed little coherence at the 
individual level. The findings replicated previously reported patterns of negligible correlations 
for such measures among random-stratified samples of Japanese and Americans, despite 
significant and frequently sizable cultural differences on most of the same measures. Zero-order 
correlations remain negligible when measures of social orientation and cognitive style are 
combined (see online supplement). However, the evidence so far concerns single-shot 
observation of inter-individual variability across measures of ostensible constructs of social 
orientation and cognitive style. Thus, it is possible that lack of coherence between tasks is due to 
low stability of tasks – stability being a prerequisite for coherence between tasks (Molenaar & 
3 Additional information regarding cultural differences in these samples is available in Kitayama, Karasawa, 
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Campbell, 2009). We addressed the question of intra-individual stability in key measures of 
social orientation / cognitive style in Study 2.
Study 2
To investigate whether within-person variability would be predictable, Study 2 examined 
whether individual measures of social orientation / cognitive style are cross-temporally stable. 
Further, we examined the stability of the relationships between individual tasks of social 
orientation and cognitive style over time by probing existence and stability of behavioral profiles. 
Such cross-temporally stable profiles can emerge despite trivial correlations among tasks 
measured at a single sampling point.
Methods
Participants and procedures. We recruited 485 adults (201 males, 281 females, 1 other, 
& 1 no response) from the Amazon Mechanical Turk at Time 1. Any worker on the MTurk could 
participate in Study 2 as long as they lived in the US or Canada. They completed eight tasks (4 
social orientation and 4 cognitive style tasks). All these tasks were selected based on the 
frequency of use in prior research as well as high internal reliability in Study 1. About one month 
after the initial data collection, we contacted participants and asked them to complete the same 
eight tasks again. Two hundred and thirty-five participants out of 485 (retention rate: 48%) 
participated in the second portion of Study 2 at Time 2. Both samples consisted predominantly of 
people of European descent (Time 1: 380 European Americans/European Canadians, 37 African 
Americans/Canadians, 26 Hispanic American/Canadians, 36 Asian Americans/Canadians, 5 
Others, & 1 no response and Time 2: 191 European Americans/Canadians, 15 African 
Americans/Canadians, 12 Hispanic American/Canadians, & 17 Asians Americans/Canadians). 
The demographic composition of the sample did not differ significantly at Time 1 vs. Time 2 
(see Table 1).
Measures of social orientation and cognitive style. We included four measures of 
social orientation and cognitive style, respectively. We selected these measures based on their 
high degree of internal stability in Study 1: Inclusion of Other in the Self scale (IOSS), Intensity 
of engaged vs. disengaged emotion, Predictor of happiness, the Self-construal scale for social 
orientation and Outside-in task, Inclusion task, Change task, and the modified Twenty Statement 
task (TST). These measures were administered in the same way as Study 1 except that 
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different ways in the modified TST. We calculated the scores for these tasks in the same way as 
Study 1. Table 7 includes inter-item reliability for each multi-item task. Note that reliability was 
calculated for sub-scale if applicable.   
Results
Internal consistency across measures. First, we examined the inter-task consistency 
among the distinct tasks measuring social orientation and cognitive style. As shown in Table 8, 
correlations among the measures of social orientation were negligible at Time 1, with the 
exception of a negative correlation between Engaged vs. Disengaged Emotions and Self-
Construal,  r = -.182, p < .001. Both mean and median correlations were close to zero, mean r = 
-.036 and median r = -.036. The same pattern was observed at Time 2. Specifically, most 
correlations were negligible, with an exception of a negative correlation between the task 
assessing the intensity of engaged vs. disengaged emotions and the self-construal task, r = -.233, 
p < .001, mean & median rs = -.024 & -.013 (Table 8).  
Turning to the cognitive style tasks (Table 9), we observed a single positive correlation 
between the tasks measuring prediction of change and a tendency for third-person memory, r 
= .127, p = .006  Overall, there was a trivial degree of inter-task convergence, mean r = .040 and 
median r =.021. Similarly, correlations were negligible at Time 2, -.113 < rs. < .019, mean r = 
-.037 and median r = -.010. To sum up, Study 2 replicated low degree of inter-individual 
stability among measures of social orientation and cognitive style, even among the tasks showing 
a conventionally moderate-high level of internal reliability.
Cross-temporal consistency. Next, we examined whether stability might be observed 
within each person over time despite the negligible correlations among measures representing 
social orientation and cognitive style. As shown on the diagonal in Table 8, for social orientation 
each measure was significantly correlated with itself across time points. Moreover, except for 
one task, the size of test-retest correlations was moderate-high, mean r = .564 and median r 
= .592. The task that showed a low test-retest correlation concerned a single-item prediction of 
happiness task, r = .161, p = .015. The single-item nature of this estimate may have resulted in 
the small-moderate cross-temporal consistency of this measure. 
Similarly, for cognitive style each measure showed a significant degree of consistency 
over time, with moderate-high degree of test-retest stability, .47 < rs < .70 (see the diagonal in 
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orientation and measures of cognitive style is not due to low inter-temporal stability of the 
measures themselves. 
Behavioral profiles. Lack of inter-task consistency in social orientation and cognitive 
style raises questions about the operationalization of these concepts as unitary constructs. 
However, research on individual differences suggests that such a unitary construct approach is 
just one of many ways to conceptualize individual differences. In particular, constructs could 
also be represented through a network of situationally-contingent relationships (Epskamp, 
Borsboom, & Fried, 2018; Fleeson & Furr, 2016; Mischel & Shoda, 1995), in turn forming latent 
profiles for individuals (Gabriel, Daniels, Diefendorff, & Greguras, 2015; Van den Akker, 
Deković, Asscher, Shiner, & Prinzie, 2013). In a similar vein, social orientation and cognitive 
style could be represented through a network of task-contingent relationships. Person A may 
score higher on the first task, but low on the second task, and moderate on the third task, whereas 
person B may score low on the first task, but moderate on the second task and high on the third 
task. Moreover, these relations might be stable across time.
To address this possibility, we estimated and tested the stability of latent profiles with 
help of latent class analyses (LCA) on the Time 1 and Time 2 data, separately. For the LCA, we 
standardized scores of each measure within each time point and selected participants who 
completed all the measures at both time points. Also, following the suggestion from Stevens 
(2012), five participants were excluded because their scores were extreme (more than 3 SDs 
above/below the mean) at one or more measures. Including these participants resulted in several 
classes with only one extreme participant in it. As a result, two hundred and thirty participants 
were analyzed in the LCA. 
Individual profiles would be considered as stable if the number and shape of classes 
identified at Time 1 and Time 2 were similar to each other and if individuals were categorized 
into the same class across two time points. We performed all latent profile analyses in Mplus 7.1 
(Muthén & Muthén, 2012) using robust maximum likelihood estimator. To determine the 
adequate number of classes, models with increasing number of classes were compared using the 
following indexes: 1) the Akaike information criterion (AIC), 2) the Bayesian information 
criterion (BIC), 3) the sample-size-adjusted Bayesian information criterion (SSA-BIC), 4) 
Entropy, 5) the Lo-Mendell-Rubin Adjusted Likelihood Ratio Test (LMRT), and 6) the 
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indicate a better fit of the model to the data (Nylund, Asparouhov, & Muthén, 2007). Entropy is 
a measure of classification quality, reflecting better quality as values approach 1 (Celeux & 
Soromenho, 1996). Finally, LMRT and BLRT indicated whether the model provided a 
significantly better model fit than a model with k-1 classes (Nylund et al., 2007).
First, results from four measures of social orientation generally pointed to a two-class 
model over the other models at both Time 1 and Time 2 (see Table 10). LMRT and BLRT 
indicates that the two-class model was better than the one class model, whereas the three-class 
model was not significantly better than the two-class model. Also, given that entropy values 
of .60 indicate around 80% correct classification, and entropy values of above .80 indicate 90% 
correct classification (Lubke & Muthén, 2007), the classification in the two-class model is 
considered as reasonably good. As shown in Figures 1(a) & 1(b), classes identified at Time 1 and 
Time were minimally different from each other. Moreover, 85% of participants (196 out of 230; 
40 in Class A & 156 in Class B) were classified into the same class across two time points. That 
is, not only were classes identified at Time 1 and Time 2 were similar to each other; participants 
belonged to the same class at both time points.
We found similar results for four measures of cognitive style. Indicators in Table 10 
suggest that a two-class model showed the best fit. Both LMRT and BLRT shows that the two-
class model was significantly better than the one-class model. Although BLRT indicates that the 
three-class model was significantly better than the two-class model, we selected the two-class 
model over the three-class model because entropy was larger in the two-class model than the 
three-class model. As shown in Figure 1(c) & 1(d), classes identified at Time 1 and Time 2 are 
virtually the same. Also, 88% of participants (203 out of 230; 15 in Class A & 188 in Class B) 
belonged to the same class across two time points. Thus, we can conclude that one’s behavior 
profile across four measure of cognitive style remained stable. We also note that a similar 
conclusion can be drawn from the three-class model.
To sum up, the results of Study 2 suggest that even internally reliable tasks assessing 
social orientation and cognitive style cannot be reduced to unitary constructs at the individual 
level: the inter-individual associations between the tasks were negligible. At the same time, most 
tasks showed at least a moderate level of intra-individual, cross-temporal stability. Moreover, 
















This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved
Analysis indicated that profiles of performance across four social orientation tasks and four 
cognitive style tasks, respectively, was quite stable from Time 1 to Time 2.  
Discussion
In the present research, two of the most widely studied concepts in cultural psychology, 
namely social orientation and cognitive style, show substantial inter-individual variability across 
tasks ostensibly measuring the same constructs. Notably, this variability is not due to intra-
individual noise. Instead, the relations between measures presented in behavioral profiles of 
these measures are stable over time. These insights call for a fundamental re-evaluation of 
assumptions among researchers interested in cultural and individual differences in these 
constructs in terms of both their operationalization and measurement. Below we summarize and 
discuss some of the implications of the present work.
First, we demonstrated that the dissociation between group- and individual-level 
processes holds when examining the most comprehensive set of measures of social orientation 
and cognitive style available to date. Specifically, Study 1 extends the observation of negligible 
inter-individual correlations between social orientation measures as well as between cognitive 
style measures (Dong et al., 2018; Kitayama et al., 2009; Marquez & Ellwanger, 2014; Na et al., 
2010; San Martin et al., 2019) to more representative samples of Japanese and Americans. And 
yet, on most measures we replicated prior research concerning cultural differences in social 
orientation and cognitive style (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Nisbett et al., 2001), observing 
medium-size effects with our age- and social-class-diverse samples (Henrich, Heine, & 
Norenzayan, 2010). Thus, despite significant group-level differences on social orientation and on 
cognitive style measures, there is no reason to expect inter-individual convergence between tasks 
for either construct. Indeed, making inferences about cross-task associations just because groups 
systematically vary on these tasks is a bona fide example of the ecological fallacy (the fallacy 
that occurs when inferences about individuals are deduced from inferences about groups to 
which those individuals belong; Robinson, 1950).
The second insight from the present research is that some of the key tasks claiming to 
measure either social orientation or cognitive style are intra-individually stable, and yet do not 
correlate with each other. This observation suggests that the lack convergence of social 
orientation and cognitive style tasks into unitary constructs is not due to lack of test-retest 
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constructs (e.g., Campbell & Fiske, 1959), raising questions about the concepts’ 
operationalization and measurement. Study 2 starts to shed light on one possible way to re-think 
these concepts. Latent profile analyses in Study 2 suggest that both social orientation and 
cognitive style could be described using a set of loosely inter-related behavioral profiles. A 
profile of loosely connected sub-components allows for substantial inter-individual variability, 
simultaneously remaining intra-individually stable over time. 
When examining the pattern of profiles identified in Study 2, differences in two classes 
for social orientation appear to be largely driven by the Inclusion-of-Others-in-the-Self task (IOS; 
see Figure 1), whereas differences in two classes for cognitive style are mostly driven by the 
Outside-in and Change tasks (see Figure 2). To test whether these patterns would be applicable 
to other samples, we sought to cross-validate the results from a set of Latent Class Analyses on 
Japanese and American data in Study 1, including only measures equivalent to those used in 
Study 2. Supplementary results reported online revealed that profiles identified from Studies 1 & 
2 were similar to each other in terms of overall shape and yet, there were also variations across 
them (see Figure S1). Though observed similarities suggest that the identified profiles in the 
present research may be generalized to other samples, observed differences between studies 
indicate that more work is necessary to systematically unpack and evaluate the stability of 
profiles across diverse samples. 
A practical implication of this perspective for culture-relevant concepts is that a single 
measurement is not sufficient to characterize either cultural or individual differences in social 
orientation or cognitive style, as it cannot capture such latent profiles. Rather, measuring people 
across multiple situations appears necessary to fully capture how different people embody or do 
not embody broad cultural constraints and affordances (Fleeson, 2007; Furr & Funder, 2004; 
Mischel & Shoda, 1995). 
The present work dovetails with emerging literature in social and personality psychology. 
In particular, research on emotion suggests that cultural differences are best understood from a 
perspective allowing for inter-individual variability in the ways emotions may manifest 
themselves (Boiger et al., 2018). For instance, there can be various types of anger, and thus, the 
vital question is what types of anger one experiences, not whether one experiences anger or not. 
Accordingly, the central question for research on culture and emotion shifts from mere presence 
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aspects of anger may be distributed across cultures (Boiger et al., 2018). Similar to this 
proposition, it may be more informative to investigate how different profiles of social orientation 
or cognitive style are distributed across cultures than to focus solely on cultural differences in 
any given aspect of social orientation and cognitive style.
Before closing, we wish to highlight some important limitations in the present research. 
Though most measures in the present research showed acceptable degree of inter-item reliability, 
further measurement work is needed to further improve the reliability of the tasks, and to 
subsequently test the inter-individual correlations between conceptually-related tasks of social 
orientation or cognitive style. Also, previously developed tasks of social orientation and 
cognitive style vary in the measurement format: Some measures consisted of Likert-type 
response scales to vignettes (the attribution task), whereas others involved open-ended recall of 
visual scenes (the change blindness task) or measured physical features of participant-generated 
drawings (the FLT). Future work may control for the response format of tasks to test whether 
inter-individual correlations among measures would improve. More relevant to the present work, 
it appears prudent to consider emerging techniques enabling cultural psychologists to analyze 
one’s behavior profile across different measures (e.g., Ram, Coccia, Conroy, Lorek, Orland, 
Pincus,… & Gerstorf, 2013). Addressing this possibility would require the generation of new 
instruments designed to assess various components of social orientation or cognitive style. 
Finally, Study 2 focused on North American participants, opening the door for exploring intra-
individual stability in social orientation and cognitive style in other cultures. 
Concluding remarks
For decades, social orientation and cognitive style have been at the center of the 
demonstration about the role of culture in thought and behavior (Grossmann & Na, 2014; 
Hamamura, 2012; Heine, 2010; Kitayama, Duffy, & Uchida, 2007; Markus & Kitayama, 2010; 
Nisbett, 2007; Norenzayan, Choi, & Peng, 2007; Tsai, 2007). The breadth of social orientation 
and cognitive style has allowed for detecting differences between many different groups such as 
gender (Kashima et al., 1995), social class (Kraus et al., 2012; Stephens, Markus, & Phillips, 
2014), and ethnicity (Markus & Conner, 2013). Possibly because of such breadth, many aspects 
of social orientation and cognitive style appear to be only loosely related to each other. We argue 
that a behavioral profile approach proposed in the present research is one way to conceptualize 
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constructs could motivate a novel program of research situating intra-individual variability in 
one’s various psychological tendencies such as emotions, motivations and behaviors.     
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number of participants for each measure in Japan and the US.
 N M Age (SD) % of Female % of College Education
Study 1: JPN 433 46.60 (13.84) 49.7% 75.8%
Study 1: US 233 48.23 (15.34) 51.1% 87.6%
Study 2: Time 1 485 36.80 (11.43) 58.1% 91.7% 
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Japan US Japan US
IOS 172 187 Inclusion 188 221
Engaged vs. 
Disengaged Emotions
429 227 Proverb 188 231
Predictor of 
Happiness
424 227 Change 178 209
Self-Inflation 173 185 Triad 172 189
Vocal Stroop 161 153 Attribution 433 188
Self-Construal 431 189 Outside in 186 228
All 154 141 FLT 178 210
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Table 3. Means, SDs, and reliabilities of measures of social orientation and cognitive style.
  Japan US JPN vs. US






IOS 5.65(1.31)  5.07(1.52) 3.81(357) <.001 0.40
Intensity of Engaged 
Emotions
0.32(0.72) .78(10) .74(10) -0.43(0.62) .78(10) .73(10) 13.26(654) <.001 1.09
Predictor of Happiness 0.50(0.48) 0.23(0.60) 6.15(649) <.001 0.51
Self-inflation -0.14(0.30) -0.25(0.40) 3.07(356) .002 0.33












Self-Construal -0.11(0.54) .65(12) .69(12) -0.43(0.88) .52(12) .62(12) 5.39(618) <.001 0.43
Inclusive reasoning 66.52(18.42) .96 (97) 47.78(18.27) .96(97) 10.30(407) <.001 1.02
Proverb 0.50(0.70) .87 (8) .88 (8) 0.32(0.80) .86 (8) .85 (8) 2.41(417) .016 0.24
Change 46.37(12.39) .70 (8) 32.1(10.61) .73(8) 12.20(385) .001 1.24
Triad (log) -0.99(0.80) .88 (14) -1.11(0.72) .78(14) 1.58(359) .115 0.18
Attribution 0.11(1.10) .67 (8) .65 (8) -0.17(1.26) .58 (8) .56 (8) 2.78(619) .006 0.24
Outside in (log) 1.17(0.74) .52 (2) 0.67(0.73) .62(2) 6.91(412) <.001 0.70
FLT 6.65(7.66) .64 (6) .48 (4) 6.83(6.74) .62 (6) .52 (6) -0.24(386) .807 -0.02
Change Blindness 0.35(0.84) .57 (4) .51(4) 0.05(0.72) .63 (4) .63 (4) 3.54(357) <.001 0.38
Underwater Animation 
(log)
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TST 0.89(0.13) .64 (20) 0.69(0.31) .86 (20) 7.78(387) <.001 0.79
Table 4. Pearson’s correlations among measures of social orientation for Japanese (below the diagonal) and Americans (above the 
diagonal).
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
1. IOS -- .070 -.015 .027 .335** -.022
2. Engaged vs. Disengaged Emotions .055 -- .110 -.108 -.016 .169*
3. Predictor of Happiness .150 .233** -- .137 -.094 -.023
4. Self-Inflation -.122 -.062 -.141 -- -.029 .022
5. Vocal Stroop .119 -.001 .131 -.065 -- .180*
6. Self-construal .148 .067 .045 .015 .048 --
                                                                                                                                                                                * p <.05 & ** p 
< .001
Table 5. Pearson’s correlations among measures of cognitive style for Japanese (below the diagonal) and Americans (above the 
diagonal).
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.
1. Inclusion -- -.022 -.019 .073 -.049 .106 -.054 .114 .082 -.052 -.002
2, Proverb .053 -- .091 .094 .017 .073 -.035 -.004 -.076 -.068 -.035
3. Change .151* -.034 -- .142 .056 .023 .089 -.090 .193** .122 -.084
4. Triad -.135 -.030 .041 -- .090 -.028 .095 -.017 .065 .209** -.111
5. Attribution -.049 -.051 .190* -.045 -- -.038 .216** -.115 .129 -.040 -.008
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7. FLT .012 -.016 .193* -.015 .116 -.006 -- .001 .133 .212** -.076
8. Change Blindness -.040 -.014 -.021 -.052 .117 .064 .115 -- -.021 -.108 -.074
9. Narrative -.063 -.065 -.004 -.030 .004 -.020 -.029 .091 -- .139 -.058
10. Underwater -.067 -.065 .185* .011 .164* .095 .158* .042 .325** -- .032
11. TST -.044 -.030 -.055 .046 .124 -.049 -.015 .166* .109 .141 --
                                                                                                                                                                               * p <.05 & ** p < .001
Table 6. Factor loadings and the percent of variance explained by the first factor. 
Social Orientation Cognitive Style
Measures JPN US ALL Measures JPN US ALL
IOS .150 .030 .308 Inclusion -.035 .085 .148
Intensity of Engaged 
Emotions
.124 .648 .088 Proverb -.004 -.082 .053
Predictor of 
Happiness
.089 .053 .025 Change .483 .229 .341
Self-Inflation .013 -.767 .000 Triad -.042 .196 .116
Vocal Stroop .040 .222 .999 Attribution .210 .073 .116
Self-Construal .999 .092 .195 Outside in .016 .261 .139
FLT .373 .224 .128
Change Blindness .040 -.113 .010
Underwater .666 .799 260
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TST .002 -.067 .189
% of Variance 17.44 17.85 19.01 % of Variance 14.11 12.14 11.87





Outside in Change Inclusion TST





.80 (4) .78 (8) .92 (6) .66 (10)





.71 (4) .67 (8) .90 (6) .72 (10)
  Note. Number of item per task is in parentheses. Predictor of Happiness task is not included, because the calculation provides one 
estimate per time point. 







Time 2 M (SD)
IOSS .697*** -.084 .076 .046 4.61 (1.61)



















.048 -.182** .486** .112 -0.18 (0.91)
Predictor of 
Happiness
-.095* -.046 .087 .161**  0.38 (1.01)
Time 1 M (SD) 4.55 (1.70) 0.55 (1.38) -0.19 (0.90) 0.43 (0.91)
Note. Cross-temporal correlations of each task (highlighted in bold) are presented on the diagonal. A both time points, a few 
participants reported not experiencing events necessary for calculation of the emotion-related measures or reported no variability in 
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Table 9. Pearson’s correlations among measures of cognitive style at Time 1 (below diagonal) & 
Time 2 (above diagonal)
Outside in Change Inclusion TST Time 2 M (SD)
Outside in .704** .018 -.112 -.107 2.88 (2.02)
Change .127** .526** -.009 -.010 28.25 (10.06)
Inclusion .019 .023 .619** -.001
47.32 (17.91)
TST .003 -.024 .092* .471** 0.20 (0.21)
Time 1 M (SD) 3.16 (2.35) 28.16 (12.08) 45.83 (17.77) 0.22(0.21)
Note. Cross-temporal correlations of each task (highlighted in bold) are presented on the 
diagonal. A both time points, a few participants reported not experiencing events necessary for 
calculation of the Outside-in measure, leading to smaller samples for this task (Time 1 n = 465 / 
Time 2 n = 231). * p <.05 & ** p < .001.
Table 10. Latent Class Analyses at Time 1 & Time 2
Social Orientation Cognitive Style
Number of Classes 2 3 4 2 3 4
AIC 2562.46 2558.16 2548.34 2570.95 2552.19 2541.16
BIC 2607.16 2620.05 2627.42 2615.64 2614.08 2620.24
SSA-BIC 2565.96 2563 2554.52 2574.44 2557.03 2547.34
Entropy .76 .83 .83 .91 .81 .85





BLRT (p) .000 .09 .000 .000 .000 .000
AIC 2395.94 2381.62 2367.72 2572.73 2541.62 2536.817
BIC 2440.64 2443.51 2446.80 2617.42 2603.50 2615.893
SSA-BIC 2399.43 2386.46 2373.90 2576.22 2546.45 2542.997
Entropy .76 .83 .85 .85 .84 .87




































Figure 1. Estimated mean levels for measures of social orientation and cognitive style for two classes at Tim 1 and Time 2. The Y 
axis reflects standardized scores.  
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